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Abstract. The financial crisis that started in 2008 embodies the failure of a system 
whose most vulnerable point was detected within the banking sector. The increasing 
loss of trust in the most important institutions of this sector throughout the crisis led 
to a gap between the perception of the financial industry representatives and that of 
the people outside it. At the same time, the crisis triggered the reconfiguration of the 
means used to maintain both financial, and price stability, and redesigned the role 
and strategy of central banks in using monetary policy tools, including 
communication. After 2008, central banks resorted to aggressive, sometimes 
unconventional monetary policies. Whether bringing interest rates close to zero or on 
negative territory, adopting quantitative easing measures or practicing forward 
guidance, central banks communicated more extensively as compared to the period 
prior to the crisis. While no consensus has been yet reached regarding the usefulness 
of these measures, researchers consider that some of them will become part of the 
usual toolkit used by central banks, which will further intensify their communication 
activity. This paper is a qualitative research that analyses the perception of the 
National Bank of Romania’s representatives – communication specialists and officials 
who were highly visible in the mass-media during that specific period – upon the loss 
of public trust in the central bank. At the same time, the interviews reflect the 
perception of the central bank’s representatives upon the effects of making the 
monetary policy more transparent during the period considered, and examine to what 
extent the chosen communication decisions can be reversible after surmounting the 
financial crisis, on an emerging market where no other unconventional monetary 
policy measures had been used.  
 






In the recent years, the transparency of the monetary policy was on an ascending 
trend, while, on the financial crisis background, the public trust in central banks 
was diminishing. For central banks, two main action lines have come forward since 
the beginning of the crisis: reaffirming the monetary policy’s flexibility, and 
assigning these institutions a greater responsibility in terms of attention given to 
the financial industry (Ciocca, 2016). Prior to 2008, the central banks that were 
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operationally independent and had as main goal inflation targeting, either 
increased or decreased monetary policy rates in order to reach the target. The 
macroeconomic and financial instability that followed proved the limitations of the 
fundamental goal of these institutions. In the first stage, central banks still applied 
conventional measures, decreasing the interest rates down to historical minimum 
thresholds. However, ensuring price stability through changes applied to monetary 
policy rates did not guarantee financial stability (Borio, 2011; Goodhart, 2011). By 
2009, most of the developed economies had already overused this tool and had 
begun to test new measures. Four of the biggest central banks worldwide – Federal 
Reserve (Fed), European Central Bank (ECB), Bank of England (BoE) and Bank of 
Japan (BoJ) – also applied extensive quantitative or qualitative easing, as well as 
forward guidance. Researchers agree that part of these monetary policies, including 
forwarding guidance, will be part of central banks’ strategy in the post-crisis period 
as well (Blinder, Ehrmann, de Haan, & Jansen, 2016). Researchers Coenen et al. 
(2017) highlight that during unconventional times, while relying on unconventional 
measures, communication about the central bank’s policy is even more important 
due to two main reasons: „First, because some of these measures are quasi‐fiscal 
and therefore impose a risk on the taxpayer, and second, because some 
unconventional tools have more tangible distributional effects, therefore leading to 
a more prominent discussion of central bank policies in the public discourse and 
requiring a greater degree of accountability” (Coenen et al., 2017). 
 
The loss of public trust in the main institutions of the financial industry affected 
central banks as well as the period considered: „It is not just bankers who have 
suffered a loss of public trust. In varying degrees, this is also true of big business, 
government and, yes, politicians and central banks” (Haldane, 2016). In the recent 
years, this crisis effect was the topic of several studies (Ehrmann, Soudan, & 
Stracca, 2013; Fischer & Hahn, 2008; Stevenson & Wolfers, 2011; Wälti, 2012). For 
instance, Ehrmann et al. (2013) analyze the factors influencing the trust in 
European Central Bank as measured by the European Commission’s 
Eurobarometer survey, and explain the loss of public trust in these institutions 
based on Economy Hypothesis – erosion within the economic evolution context; 
Europe Hypothesis, as the global financial crisis exposed „policy makers limitations 
in preventing and solving global problems and the trust in the ECB has suffered 
because it is a European institution”; and Banks Hypothesis, in so far as, in public 
opinion, ECB was associated with the problems faced by the banking sector that 
was undeservedly supported and helped.  
 
Previously, researchers Fischer and Hahn (2008) had shown that „the effect of 
macroeconomic conditions of an economy for a citizen’s trust in the ECB depends 
on her knowledge on the European Union and its institutions”. At the same time, El-
Erian (2016, p.18) noticed that, regarding central banks, „the gap between 
awareness and reality is big, very big. It is one that cannot be justified by the 
irrelevance of the issues at hand (they are very relevant to our individual and 
collective well-beings) or by the lack of information”.  
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This work intends to bring forth new information related to the communication 
used by central banks on the emerging markets, by discussing the changes towards 
greater transparency that were visible in National Bank of Romania’s (NBR) 
communication strategy as monetary policy throughout the financial crisis. At the 
same time, the research presents NBR representatives’ perception upon the loss of 
public trust in the central bank during the crisis, and upon the reasons that led to 
that loss. The paper proposes a radiography of the communication activity, based 
on the opinions of NBR representatives involved in this activity; on the way, they 
perceived or implemented, from the inside, the changes regarding the 
communication strategy; as well as on the assessment of the limitations involved by 
transparency. Researchers warn that the activity of central banks did not change 
equally much in all countries. Romania is one of the East-European emerging 
markets that did not face banking bankruptcies after 2008, where unconventional 
measures were applied partially or at all.  
 
Making the monetary policy more transparent both prior, and during the crisis and 
the loss of public trust in central banks are some of the less approached topics of 
the academic literature related to the emerging European markets, such as 
Romania (see, for example, Dumiter, 2014; Égert, 2007; Hristev, 2014; Valentin & 
Rozalia, 2008). Therefore, studying NBR’s communication activity during a crisis 
could provide useful data for the researchers interested in the communication of 
central banks in this area. Furthermore, the results of the research provide a 
perspective upon the central bank’s post-crisis communication, based on the 
assessment of the communication strategy applied – a subject that could be the 
topic of future research. 
 
 
Changes in central bank communication – general remarks on trust and 
transparency  
 
Studies on central banks’ transparency show that the monetary policy triggers the 
best effects if it is predictable. Public expectations regarding the future, including 
the future decisions related to monetary policies, are important because they affect 
the present economic behavior (Bernanke, 2001). Transparency has to do with how 
easy is for the public to deduce central bank intentions from observables (Faust & 
Svensson, 2001). Jeanneau (2009) states that a better communication related to the 
actions taken by central banks decreases the uncertainty faced by the economic 
agents. During post-crisis period researchers identified a major change in the 
essence of uncertainties as compared to pre-crisis period and showed that 
ambiguity comes to prevail risk and become a relevant driver of agents’ actions 
(Kozlowski, Veldkamp, & Venkateswaran, 2015; Rossi, Sekhposyan, & Soupre, 
2016).  
 
It’s important that the public understands central bank’s actions „not only for 
reasons of democratic legitimacy (…) but also in order for monetary policy to be 
most effective” (Woodford, 2005). Minegishi and Cournède (2009) also state that 
increased transparency is associated to better anchored inflation-related 
expectations, and, therefore, to a more stable inflation. The same aspect is 
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highlighted by researchers Dincer and Eichengreen (2013) who demonstrate, based 
on a transparency index and using the available data for 100 countries up to 2006 
that increased transparency reduces inflation fluctuations.  
 
Researchers Van der Cruijsen, Eijffinger and Hoogduin (2010) used both 
uncertainty and confusion/information overload as the two theoretical arguments 
to support the occurrence of an optimal intermediate level of central bank 
transparency at which the perceived quality of estimated inflation is optimized as 
has been shown (Van der Cruijsen et al., 2010). As Horvath and Vaško (2016) 
underlined „financial stability transparency is greater in more developed countries, 
especially in those with Nordic and German legal origin”. Some researchers define 
central bank transparency based on the absence of informational asymmetry 
between the monetary policy decision-makers and other economic agents (Geraats, 
2002). Geraats (2002) distinguishes between five aspects of transparency: political, 
economic, procedural, tactic and operational.  
 
There are many researchers that analyse the possible limits or the adverse effects 
of central banks increased transparency. For example, Ehrmann, Eijffinger, and 
Fratzscher (2012) found that: „Increasing economic transparency seems to be 
particularly powerful at low levels of transparency. Yet at higher levels, the 
additional effects that can be reaped by further enhancements of economic 
transparency appear to be much smaller”. Considering the way central bank 
communication affects the capacity of financial markets to anticipate monetary 
policy, Kool, Middeldorp, and Rosenkranz (2011) conclude: „Central banks should 
be aware of possible adverse effects of transparency and take note if market 
participants reduce investment in information”. Many other researchers share the 
idea that increased transparency does not necessarily increase the effectiveness of 
monetary policy (Gosselin, Lotz, & Wyplosz, 2006; Kool & Thornton, 2015; Mishkin, 
2004; Morris & Shin, 2002). The stock market response to central bank 
transparency is also subject to several studies (Jarocinski & Karadi, 2017; 
Papadamou, Sidiropoulos, & Spyromitros, 2014)  
 
King (2016, p.179) warns that „Transparency is, however, not an end in itself. Any 
requirement for transparency in a central bank’s deliberations should have the aim 
of improving the quality of its decisions”. King (2016, pp.207-208) also notices that, 
prior to the crisis, inflation targeting seemed to be the winning strategy in order to 
maintain price stability, involving deep changes related to central banks 
communication: „Communication became more important, and central banks 
moved from mystery and mystique to transparency and openness”.  
 
Based on the research conducted during the first two years of crisis (2008 - 2010) 
on monetary regimes of the central banks in Wellington, Frankfurt, Stockholm, and 
London, Holmes (2013, xi–xii) concluded that all of them had the same feature: „the 
monetary regime (...) was about language, about communication, and (...) the 
ultimate aim of these communications was to recruit the public, broadly conceived, 
to collaborate with central bankers in achieving the ends of monetary policy”. 
Holmes (2013, p.64) also states that confidence is „mediated by culture, a 
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communicative culture”: „Expectations about the development of prices became 
manifest in real plans for budgets, for investment, for stocking inventories, for 
expanding or contracting employment, and, above all, for negotiating wages, for 
setting prices, for computing various commercial interest rates”.  
 
Some researchers consider that defective communication during the financial crisis 
was also one of the reasons for the public loss of trust in the main institutions 
involved. For instance, Blinder (2013, p.357) states that, during the crisis, the US 
financial and banking system lost their public as a result of their own discourse, 
which sometimes proved to be “disastrous”: „The failure to frame the bank bailout 
strong effectively was symptomatic of a much larger failure to communicate”. In 
these circumstances, Haldane (2016) considers that communication has the role to 
recover, during the post-crisis period, the loss of trust triggered during the crisis 
between the financial and banking sector on the one hand, and the general public 
on the other hand.  
 
Researchers agree that the more extensive use of forwarding guidance, especially 
when the interest rates are decreased to historical minimum thresholds, is the most 
important change in central banks communication (Blinder et al., 2016; Filardo & 
Hofmann, 2014), and that public trust and perceived transparency are positively 
related (Van der Cruijsen & Eijffinger, 2010). In their attempt to establish the main 
reasons for the public loss of trust in central banks, researchers Ehrmann et al. 
(2013) focused on the main pre-crisis factors, also stating that a better knowledge 
of the central bank activity – in their analysis, specifically of the European Central 
Bank – generates more trust in normal times and even more so during the financial 
crisis. Taking responsibilities that go beyond their essential goals represents 
another important reason which led to a credibility loss after 2008. In these 
circumstances, King (2016, p.180) considers that central banks could retain their 
credibility if they admit their limitations: “To retain credibility, it is important that 
central banks do not claim to know more than they in fact do”. 
 
But how do the central bankers evaluate the received criticism during the crisis and 
the threats to independence? As Blinder, Ehrmann, Jansen, and De Haan (2017) 
reinforced, while 40% of the academics generally think that their country´s central 
bank received “a lot of criticism”, only approximatively10% from the central 
bankers considered that they received “a lot of criticism”. When assessing the 
criticism central banks have received in their crisis-fighting efforts, 30% of the 
central bankers reported that their institution didn’t receive any criticism. They are 
also less concerned about threats to the central bank’s independence from their 
government, with almost 70 percent of central bankers seeing no or only little 
threats to independence – in contrast to almost 40 percent of academics seeing 
moderate or even substantial threats to independence (Blinder et al., 2017). 
 
As part of the emerging economies in the European Union, Romania followed the 
same stereotype and it benefited from the financial support from IMF, EU, EBRD. 
Radu (2016) states that „the abundance of cheap money, the real estate boom, the 
weakness of the financial regulatory system created important vulnerabilities that 
brought Romania on the edge of economic collapse”. Referring to the Romanian 
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financial market, researchers agree on the fact that „the banking system should be 
more responsible, and its management more aware of the weight it carries” 
(Treapăt & Anghel, 2014, p.483).  
 
 
Study goals and method  
 
This article examines how the National Bank of Romania’s representatives perceive 
the loss of public trust in the central bank during the crisis and its causes, and, at 
the same time, analyzes, from the perspective of the same representatives, to which 
extent one of the profound changes in NBR communication implemented starting 
with 2016 – namely releasing the minutes of the monetary policy meetings – will 
remain in place after surmounting the financial crisis. Making the monetary policy 
more transparent during the crisis and the loss of public trust in central banks are 
some of the less approached topics of the academic literature related to the 
emerging European markets, such as Romania. Therefore, studying NBR’s 
communication activity during a crisis could provide useful data for the researchers 
interested in the communication of central banks in this area. Furthermore, the 
results of the research provide a perspective upon the central bank’s post-crisis 
communication, based on the assessment of the communication strategy applied – 
a subject that could be the topic of future research. Therefore, the article intends to 
see whether part of the results of the research conducted by Blinder et al. (2016) on 
the changes regarding the central banks communication towards increased 
transparency is also validated on the Romanian emerging market, where 
unconventional measures related to monetary policy, negative interest rates, and 
quantitative and qualitative easing have not been used. Based on a survey sent to 
95 central banks worldwide, as well as to over 400 economists, Blinder et al. (2016) 
concluded that the changes in the central banks communication will linger even 
after the crisis ends, and a “large minority” (approx. 20%, but only 7% of the 
governors coming from advanced economies) anticipates new changes towards an 
even greater transparency.  
 
At the same time, the research also takes into account how, during the financial 
crisis, the National Bank of Romania’s representatives perceive the loss of public 
trust in their institution and which are, in their opinion, the main causes for this. 
Trust was not precisely defined, leaving room for interpretation from the 
interviewees. The data was collected following a qualitative research based on 
individual information-collecting semi-structured interviews taken with 20 NBR 
representatives. The 20 participants to the interviews conducted between January 
and April 2017 were selected based on the expertise and involvement level in the 
National Bank of Romania’s communication activity, as well as based on their 
seniority within the institution, so that they be able to place within a historical 
perspective the communication activity evolution, in the context of the necessary 
pre-crisis – post-crisis comparison.  
 
The interviewees making up the sample were: a member of the NBR management 
board, three advisors of the Governor, three strategy consultants, six managing and 
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deputy directors, four communication and PR experts, one head of the department, 
one economist and a former NBR advisor on financial education projects. Their 
seniority in the institution varies between over 30 years (two of the interviewees 
are NBR employees since 1986 and 1987) and 4 years. The average work seniority 
in the central bank of the interviewees that make up this sample is 17.5 years. 11 
representatives of the interviewees were visible in the mass-media throughout the 
entire financial crisis, through statements, presentations during press conferences 
or seminars, and opinions published on the NBR blog. The other 9 were involved in 
creating and implementing the communication strategy, in writing the messages 
disseminated throughout the crisis or in organizing events, seminars and 
presentations, which had as result the exposure of the institution to mass-media or 
the specialized public, also on other issues than the ones triggered by the financial 
crisis. Regarding the represented departments, 7 respondents are (or were) part of 
the Communication Directorate of the National Bank of Romania between 2008 and 
2017. Other representative directorates covered by the interviewees are the 
Directorate for Financial Stability, the Directorate for Economic Modelling and 
Forecasts, the Directorate for Legal Affairs, the Directorate for Secretariat and 
Public Relations. In terms of gender representation, 12 respondents are men, and 8 
are women. 
 
The research questions that guided the scientific approach refer to the 
representatives’ perception upon public trust in NBR and making communication 
more transparent: 
Q1. What is the NBR representatives’ perception upon the loss of public trust in the 
central bank and its causes? 
Q2. The communication changes towards increased monetary policy transparency – 
more precisely, publishing the minutes of the monetary policy meetings – will 
linger after surmounting the financial crisis or are reversible? 
 
Having these research questions as focus points, the interviews also targeted other 
areas of the communication activity in the post-crisis period, which will be 





How the loss of trust is perceived 
 
Most of the interviewed NBR representatives stated that, in their opinion, starting 
with 2008, an erosion of the public trust in the institution they represent occurred. 
However, the research findings reveal a balance in assessing the degree of this loss 
of trust. 9 of the respondents considered that “the loss of trust was relatively 
insignificant”, “there was no loss of trust, but a battle to trigger a trust crisis” or “a 
solidarity test for the institution”, while 11 of them acknowledged a trust crisis. 4 of 
the interviewees who perceived a small loss of trust considered that the focus 
moved from the institution onto its management: the trust crisis did not affect the 
institution, but rather “the governor’s credibility, as well as that of the employees 
with management roles was doubted”. Some of the interviewees who tried to 
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estimate how much time would be needed to recover the trust that was lost during 
the financial crisis stressed the need for a longer timeframe (that could extend even 
to a generation). The difficult change of mentalities, along with the absence of 
unbiased mass-media, represented the main explanations for a possible delay in 
recovering the public trust level prior to 2008.  
 
Very high reputation and general context 
 
5 interviewees related the decline of the public trust in NBR to the very good 
reputation that the institution used to have before and in the first part of the crisis, 
more precisely until 2013. The loss of trust didn’t occur right after the crisis started 
worldwide, a fact which is visible in the opinion barometers as well. For instance, 
the IRSOP barometer (IRSOP, 2016) shows that, in March 2016, for 44,2% of the 
Romanians, „the trust level in NBR was high and very high, as compared with 
51,3% in December 2014. The interviewees also referred to an “extraordinary 
prestige”, to the fact that, in the first years after 2008, “everyone loved NBR because 
during the crisis it had the most rational institutional behavior”.  
 
At the same time, the interviewees explain the loss of public trust in NBR referring 
to the evolution of the economy, to tracking the financial crisis epicenter within the 
banking sector, and to the overall loss of trust in the European institutions, and not 
only: „Central banks have entered a new historical period, much more complicated, 
and more difficult. Since they were cornered, their credibility was affected 
everywhere: Fed, ECB, NBR, although NBR had a great advantage (...) since we 
didn’t have the threat of bankruptcies to force us into interventions that would 
further tension the public budget”.  
 
The high level of prestige that NBR enjoyed prior to the crisis is associated with this 
general decline, visible also on the European emerging markets that did not face the 
high public and private debt. Some interviewees considered that the public 
expectations regarding the central bank were oversized, and NBR “agreed to play 
this game, accepting the fact that it has answers and solutions to all problems”.  
 
NBR – defender of the banks 
 
The communication of monetary policy goals was complemented and sometimes 
sent to the background during the crisis by the messages related to the financial 
market regulation and supervision. On the Romanian market, among the important 
subjects that complemented the fundamental goal after 2008, NBR was involved in 
the debates related to the changes to the Tax Code (2014); the Swiss franc loans 
crisis (2015-2016); the Greek-owned banks crisis (2015); the changes to the law of 
mortgage lending (giving in payment law, freezing of the Swiss franc - Romanian 
national currency exchange rate) (2015 – 2017). This study is focused mainly on 
the effects generated by the debates on two issues that erupted during 2015 – 2016 
– the Swiss franc loans crisis and giving in payment law. 
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In the NBR representatives’ opinion, the “bank defender” tag attached by some of 
the mass-media after these actions might have two further explanations. Some of 
the respondents consider that the tag was favored by NBR’s too sustained and vocal 
intervention: “I think we were in the media too many times and we made too many 
statements”, “now everyone gets to speak on behalf of NBR”. However, for some of 
the interviewees, the reason for this coming forward isn’t the lack of a proper 
dosage regarding the institution’s messages, but the lack of proper reaction from 
commercial banks: “NBR spoke as much as it had to. NBR seemed vocal (...) because 
the banks themselves kept silent”, “commercial banks were the ones to leave the 
impression that they are defended by NBR”, “the central bank had to bear all alone 
this weight that the commercial banks left when backing off”. There are also 
opinions stating that “no matter what we’d say, those who put the ‘bank defender’ 
tag on us were those who were directly interested, namely those who were affected 
by the previous behavior”. 
 
The evaluation of the communication activity focuses on five communication tactics 
and lines that, from the interviewees’ point of view, were missing from the 
communication strategy and could have contributed to maintaining and increasing 
the general public trust in the institution during the period considered. By the 
number of respondents who mentioned them, these are a better coordination of 
public appearances, a proactive attitude, focusing on the fundamental goal of the 
central bank, diversifying the communication channels and empathy. Most of the 
respondents (7) mentioned the lack of public appearances coordination, the 
absence of a “single voice” or of a “unifying language”, “better structured messages 
between communicators, increased coherence and less personal pride”, and also 
the fact that, in the case of legislative changes, “the Management Board did not 
speak alongside the Governor”.  
 
The lack of proactive attitude in NBR’s communication was mentioned by 6 of the 
20 respondents, who considered that “we could interfere faster”, “communication 
should have been rather proactive”, “more resolute decisions failed to be taken in 
some situations”. Some interviewees consider that “the main elements in the bank’s 
activity should be better promoted and understood, and, based on them, the 
credibility that was lost has to be recovered and rebuilt”, while some others state 
that the proactive communication attitude should have been doubled by the 
communication channels diversification, noticing that those who sent the messages 
which contributed to the loss of trust in NBR reached the general public “perhaps 
because they speculated more efficient communication channels”. The interviewees 
identified empathy as the lacking element in building up some of the messages: 
“back then, for image purposes, empathy would have helped”, “if empathy is a 
communication element, then yes, we could have been more emphatic”. 
 
In the context of shaping the NBR’s image as bank defender, some of the 
interviewees criticized “the lack of solidarity of the banking sector” and considered 
that the lack of reaction from the central bank wouldn’t have been justified, 
underlining that „if the banking industry is creating systemic risks, it must change 
its attitude, you can’t drag them on, you can’t defend them no matter what”. 
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Therefore, some of the expressed opinions highlight the absence of a coherent 
internal communication process within the Romanian banking sector – a topic that 
is worthy of a dedicated paper. The results of a research focused on organizational 
communication in five knowledge-intensive services sectors in Romania 
(advertising-marketing, IT&C, banking, research-development and higher-
education) showed that the bank's employees consider that their interests are not 
fully represented by the existent branch union (Cismaru & Leovaridis, 2014).  
 
Target audience  
 
In the interviewees’ opinion, one of the main reasons for the loss of trust was the 
low level of understanding of central bank’s fundamental goal and of NBR’s overall 
activity amongst the general audience. More precisely, 9 of the 20 respondents 
mentioned the “financial and economic illiteracy” as a factor that made possible an 
effortless manipulation of the general public. Therefore, during the recent years, 
without direct knowledge, the general public supposedly shaped its perceptions 
based on the information received/heard from the “noisy opinion-makers”.  
 
The respondents’ opinions are thus different: most of them blame this effect 
exclusively on the understanding level, but there are also opinions that stress the 
decisive role of some influencers and endorsers whose intention was to manipulate 
the general public. In this context, as previously highlighted, some of the 
interviewees underlined the lack of a proactive attitude from NBR, which, during 
the crisis, would have alleviated this lack of understanding amongst the general 
public. Regarding the reasons for the loss of trust, some interviewees also added 
the fact that even the audience that analyses the central bank in relation to its goal 
could have been negatively affected by the “failure to reach the exact inflation 
targeting for a long time”.  
 
 
Publishing the minutes of the monetary policy meetings – reversible or not? 
 
Most of the central banks in the world, including the ECB, Fed, BoE followed the 
path to an intensive communication activity while implementing “unorthodox” 
monetary policies. As Coenen et al. (2017) consider, “the intention of the central 
banks has been to publicly define the scope and implementation of these 
unconventional policies, as well as to build a common understanding of their 
effectiveness”. The NBR has not been an exception to this rule. As Table 1 indicates, 
the instruments used by Romanian central bank to announce monetary policy 
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Table 1. Instruments used by central banks to announce 
 monetary policy decisions 
 
 
According to Dincer and Eichengreen (2013) transparency index, NBR was 
evaluated in 2010 at 7.5 points (indices ranges from 0 to 15). The most transparent 
central banks in 2010 were the Swedish Riksbank, the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, the Central Bank of Hungary, the Czech National Bank, the Bank of England 
and the Bank of Israel as has been shown (Dincer & Eichengreen, 2013). Following 
the path established by Dincer and Eichengreen (2013), researchers Horvath and 
Vaško (2016) constructed an index reflecting central banks’ financial stability in 
110 countries, from 2000 to 2011. United Kingdom, Czech Republic, and Hungary 
are placed top with the highest Financial Stability Transparency Index (index 
values as of 2011), while Romania comes in 9th place. According to the above 
mentioned researchers, an increased transparency is valuable during usual 
financial phases but during financial crisis periods, it can become one of the 
determining factors of a higher financial stress.  
 
During the last seven years, NBR has made significant progress towards increased 
transparency. The process started in 2005 when the National Bank of Romania 
adopted the strategy of directly targeting inflation, thus entering the stage of using 
communication as a monetary policy tool. Transparency of monetary policy 
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decisions is noticeable in publishing the monetary policy meetings calendar of the 
Management Board, in publishing the press releases, and in bringing forth the press 
releases by the Governor during the press briefings after each such MB meeting. At 
the same time, the Report on inflation and the monetary policy framework are 
discussed at quarterly conferences. In 2016, NBR increased monetary policy 
transparency by including a new communication method that consisted of 
publishing the minutes of the monetary policy meetings. The same year, the central 
bank decided to also disclose the income of NBR’s MB members. NBR is also one of 
the first central banks worldwide that decided to publish, starting with 2006, and 
regular reports on financial stability.  
 
Most of the interviewees (15) consider that the most recent decision in favor of 
transparency – namely publishing the minutes of the monetary policy meetings – 
won’t be reversible after the financial crisis ends. 4 respondents did not make 
predictions, one of them arguing that, in order to be able to give an answer, “there 
are many factors to take into account, not only financial and banking-related but 
politics-related as well”. Only one respondent considered that this measure could 
be reversible on the long run, based on a historical perspective – “history shows us 
that nothing we gained is gained for good”.  
 
Overall, the role of monetary policy transparency is seen as an important one for 
the results of the decisions taken. Estimating that NBR won’t abandon the 
transparency-related measures, 12 interviewees consider the publication of the 
summaries as “a progress”, a decision that “decreases incertitude and the volatility 
of expectations”, a measure that brought NBR “alongside important peers”, also 
stating that “our transparency process standards are very high”. Only two 
interviewees argue the irreversibility of summary publishing exclusively by 
anticipating the negative public reactions in the case of such scenario. However, 
some of the interviewees point out the limitations of the transparency process and 
reflect upon the reactive character of the decision taken by NBR during a moment 
imposed by the market, imposed by the “financial sector discontinuity at a global 
level”. One respondent considered that the transparency process would be more 
efficient if the summary published would also include the names of the decision-
makers, reasoning that “the summary should make one accountable”. 
 
 
Discussion and conclusions  
 
The initial research questions highlighted the relevant aspects of the way in which 
the National Bank of Romania’s representatives perceived the loss of trust in their 
institution. The interviewees’ comments regarding the impact of the financial crisis 
upon the central bank’s credibility confirm that the loss of trust did not spare the 
central bank of this emergent European market either – a market that, after 2008, 
did not face banking bankruptcies and did not implement unconventional monetary 
policy measures. This study could identify a consensus regarding the general public 
loss of trust in NBR.  
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This research concludes that the public loss of trust in NBR during the financial 
crisis can be explained, from the point of view of the central bank’s representatives, 
by the following complementary factors: (i) a very high level of credibility that NBR 
used to have prior to 2008 and in the first part of the crisis, as well as assuming, in 
this context, certain powers that went beyond its mandate (ii) the overall loss of 
trust in the main actors of worldwide financial markets (iii) the low financial 
education level of the general public on the Romanian market.  
 
Assuming powers beyond the mandate, which is a vulnerability of big central banks 
during crisis, as highlighted in several studies, as well as stated by representatives 
of these institutions – see (Blinder, 2013; El-Erian, 2016; Haldane, 2016; King, 
2016) – also occurred in the case of the National Bank of Romania. Overall, the 
interviewees’ opinions also point towards causes and arguments related to the 
public knowledge level regarding NBR’s activity and fundamental goal (price 
stability), validating some of the results brought forth by researchers Ehrmann et 
al. (2013), Fischer and Hahn (2008), who had highlighted the relation between the 
knowledge about ECB and the trust in that institution.  
 
Some interviewees reflected upon the communication strategy implemented by the 
institution and pointed out five communication tactics and directions, which, in 
their opinion, were missing from the communication strategy, but could have 
contributed to maintaining and increasing the general public trust in the institution 
during the period considered: a better coordination of public appearances, a 
proactive attitude, focusing on the fundamental goal of the central bank, 
diversifying the communication channels, and empathy. Following the assessment 
of the communication strategy applied after 2008, the results of this research can 
open a perspective upon the central bank’s post-crisis communication strategy, a 
subject that could be a topic of future research. 
 
In line with some of the research results conducted by Blinder et al. (2016), the 
answers of the 20 NBR representatives confirm the irreversible character of the 
decisions taken by the central bank of Romania in order to increase monetary 
policy transparency, by publishing the minutes of the monetary policy meetings. 
 
All the communication tactics and directions highlighted by NBR’s representatives 
with regard to the communication strategy during the crisis can become as many 
guidelines for both financial organizations and significant organizations for other 
markets managing high risks during financial crises periods especially. The findings 
should raise further reflection on the efficiency of the communication strategy and 
particularly on the proper toolkit mix and on the optimal communication strategy 
at the onset of a new possible financial crisis. Studying central banks 
communication could reveal relevant findings not only for enriching recent 
researches conducted in this area – as central bank communication has a recent 
history - but also for offering useful insights for other key-institutions on financial 
market and on other markets as well.  
 
In order to examine the possibility to extend the findings of this qualitative 
research future research should focus on quantitative research. In pursuance of a 
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complete picture of the financial crisis impact upon NBR’s credibility and of the 
results regarding the transparency process, this research can be complemented by 
a quantitative analysis based on a media analysis applied to 2014 - 2016, a period 
which is representative for the participation of the institution’s officials in debates 
focused on the supervision and regulation of the banking sector. At the same time, 
the perception-related analysis can be complemented by the results of surveys 
focused on both general and specialized public, in order to highlight how the two 
audience categories perceived the loss of trust in the National Bank of Romania 
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